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Summary 
The much-cited article ‘the Myths and Facts of Patent Troll and Excessive Payment: Have 
Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs) Been Overcompensated1’ by Jack J. Lu is fundamentally 
flawed and based on data which cannot be retrieved. The key error results from poorly defined 
samples, selected to substantiate the statement that hold-up does not exist and that Non-
Practicing Entities are not overcompensated. Even if the article had succeeded in adequately 
selecting the samples subject to the analysis, the document would still fall short of determining 
what constitutes a comparable licensing agreement. Also, the findings cannot be verified as the 
article does not disclose the underlying data that leads to the conclusion that NPEs are not 
overpaid. Hence, the paper falls short of meeting three fundamental requirements of empirical 
research. There is no adequate selection of the two samples that are compared (the NPE sample 
and a vaguely defined sample of ‘other companies’), there is also no adequate selection of 
comparable rates and last but not least, the data cannot be retrieved. Other than that, the 
 
1 Lu, J. J. (2012). The myths and facts of patent troll and excessive payment: have nonpracticing 
entities (NPEs) been overcompensated? Business Economics, 47, p.234. Title of the article 
1
 ibid, p. 245 
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research paper suffers from the application of concepts which are not defined and lacks 
adequate references to the academic literature. These aspects taken together mean that it is not 
possible to draw any sorts of conclusions on the grounds of the analysis presented and render 
the article obsolete. 
 
Encapsulating the Research Question 
This article sets out to offer empirical proof that hold up is a myth and that an NPE, or ‘patent 
troll2,’ as called in the paper, is not overcompensated. In fact, the paper suggests that NPEs 
may be undercompensated.3  
The article needs to be understood within the context of the wider political debate on the 
polemically called ‘patent troll’ phenomenon. The concept of using patents for the sole purpose 
of licensing them to third parties has been subject to hefty criticism.4 Arguments put forward 
for example have been that the role of the patent system is not to merely seek to extract funds 
from operating companies, but to provide a genuine incentive to invest in inventions.5 Such 
inventions are ideally in use in products and services and serve in one way or the other 
humanity.  
An NPE to the contrary has as its business goal to obtain licensing income from third parties 
who use such inventions in products and services. Because an NPE does not produce anything, 
it cannot be counter sued for patent infringement. This, so the argument, can ‘disarm’ operating 
 
2
 Lu, J. J. (2012). The myths and facts of patent troll and excessive payment: have nonpracticing 
entities (NPEs) been overcompensated? Business Economics, 47, p.234. Title of the article 
3
 ibid, p. 245 
4
 Luman III, J. F., & Dodson, C. L. (2006). No longer a myth, the emergence of the patent troll: 
stifling innovation, increasing litigation, and extorting billions. Intellectual Property & Technology 
Law Journal, 18(5), 12-16, Helmers, C., Love, B., & McDonagh, L. (2013). Is there a patent troll 
problem in the UK. Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. LJ, 24, 509, Coursey, C. C. (2009). Battling 
the patent troll: tips for defending patent infringement claims by non-manufacturing patentees. Am. J. 
Trial Advoc., 33, 237. 
5
 Heinecke, G. (2015). Pay the Troll Toll: The Patent Troll Model Is Fundamentally at Odds with the 
Patent System's Goals of Innovation and Competition. Fordham L. Rev., 84, 1153. 
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companies. They may not be able to apply some of the litigation tactics that they would 
otherwise employ to counter a licensing request.6  
The article reduces the complexity of the policy issues at stake to the simple question if NPEs 
are able to get higher royalty rates than other market participants.7  The question the document 
is eager to find empirical proof for is whether a NPEs are able to obtain supra normal royalty 
rates in damages, settlements, or royalties.8  
The possibility that some operating companies can also act in an NPE type fashion is ignored 
in the text.9 A company may for example operate in a different technology space as it licenses 
to and can hence also not be counter sued for that reason. The article does also not address the 
question whether NPEs are more easily able to extract royalty rates from third parties or if they 
can do so in a more cost-effective manner, which would be a highly interesting research 
question.  
The author further more seeks to establish the argument that NPEs are over compensated by 
making use of the ‘hold-up’ terminology.10 Hold-up by background refers to a Wiliamson’s 
transaction costs economics argument.11 Essentially, so the concept, an operating company has 
made important investments on the basis of a certain patented technology. If confronted with a 
licensing request, it either has the choice to comply with this licensing request or to write off 
its investments as sunk costs. This can mean that a licensing rate is reflective of the asymmetric 
 
6
 Cooper, L. (2014). Patent Trolls and Other Bad Guys. Journal of Information Ethics, 23(2), 57. 
7
 Lu, J. J. (2012). The myths and facts of patent troll and excessive payment: have nonpracticing 
entities (NPEs) been overcompensated? Business Economics, 47, p.235 
8
 ibid, p.235 
9
 McMahon, T. P., Akerley, S. J., & Bu, J. H. (2006). Who Is a Troll: Not a Simple Answer. 
In Sedona Conf. J. (Vol. 7, p. 159). 
10
 Lu, J. J. (2012). The myths and facts of patent troll and excessive payment: have nonpracticing 
entities (NPEs) been overcompensated? Business Economics, 47, p.236, 237 
11
 See for example. Shapiro, C. (2010). Injunctions, hold-up, and patent royalties. American Law and 
Economics Review, 12(2), 280-318 or Koss, P. A., & Eaton, B. C. (1997). Co-specific investments, 
hold-up and self-enforcing contracts. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 32(3), 457-470. 
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power relationship that prevails between the licensor and the licensee. By consequence, the 
licensee may be overpaying for a license.  This argument forms an important part of the debate 
on standard essential patents, which the article makes no mention of.  
Such a situation can be pronounced if the patent reads on a minor technological feature. This 
issue is ignored in the paper. It would for example be interesting to learn if patents that read on 
a minor feature of a technology obtain the same licensing rate as patents that protect core 
features.  
 
There is a lack of adequate definitions in the document 
In order to determine whether NPEs have been overcompensated or not, the article looks at 
the rates that one sample of companies received, which are called ‘NPEs’ and compares these 
rates with a sample, which are called ‘other companies.’ The article makes no statement what 
these rates are for, what the subject of the license is, how many patents the licensing 
agreement encompassed or if there are any other aspects in the licensing contract which 
would be worthwhile reflecting.   
Furthermore, the article would need to provide core definitions of what is meant by the term 
‘overcompensated’12 or the term ‘operating company.’13 Who is qualified as ‘other licensors’ 
 
12
 The term overcompensated is defined as ‘higher payments than what the intrinsic value of the 
patent is.’ Lu, p. 236 But what then is the intrinsic value of the patent? P. 246 contains a discussion of 
the ‘value matrix puzzle’ but it is not made clear if this debate defines the so-called ‘intrinsic value’ of 
the patent. On page 236 he argues that ‘In other words, the patent 
holder commands a premium above the benchmark royalty by demanding a share of the saved 
redesign cost and/or a share of the infringer’s profit during the redesign period. Whether this is the 
definition remains unclear in the paper. 
13
 On p.240 I can only see what an operating company is not. It is not a university, research institute, 
federal laboratory or an individual. However, such a rough description provided with no further 
justification is not enough to define the term ‘operating company’ and help understand why it should 
obtain fundamentally different licensing rates from a NPE. 
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remains unclear and is not further established in text.14 Throughout the article one is unable to 
find such a discussion as I show in the table below.15    
Table 1: Key terms that would require a clear definition and the article’s inadequate reflection 
of these definitions 
 
NPE  
there is no adequate working definition for 
his empirical model. One can find a brief 
discussion of the term, but it is unclear what 
definition is used for the empirical model and 
if the statement made informs the model or 
not. 16 
…patent trolls are a subset of NPEs, and 
that some business models are perceived to 
be more troll-like than others. The non-
innovating NPEs (NINPEs), with revenue 
mainly from settlements and damage awards 
are the most troll-like. Alternatively, the 
narrowest definition of troll is an NPE that 
uses weak patents to hold up practicing 
companies or to file multiple suits that result 
in settlements because the practicing17 
Intrinsic Value 
There is no definition of the term intrinsic 
value. The statement is instrumental in 
informing hold-up; hence it would be 
important to identify a definition that informs 
the empirical model, but this cannot be found 
in the paper. 
The argument that NPEs may hold up 
practicing 
companies and demand higher payments 
than the intrinsic value of a patent is 
intuitively appealing.18 
 
The article contains a discussion of the 
‘value matrix puzzle’ but it is not made 
clear if this debate defines the so-called 
‘intrinsic value’ of the patent.19 It is 
furthermore argued that ‘In other words, the 
patent holder commands a premium above 
the benchmark royalty by demanding a 
share of the saved redesign cost and/or a 
share of the infringer’s profit during the 
redesign period. 20‘ 
 
Whether this is the definition remains 
unclear in the paper. 
 
14
 ‘This study takes an alternative approach, the market-comparable approach, which compares the 
royalties earned by NPE licensors with those earned by other licensors.’ Lu P. 240 Furthermore on 
p.240 Lu defines ‘other licensors’ as ‘practicing companies as licensors and exclude transactions 
with licensors as universities, research institutions, federal laboratories, and individuals.’ Also here it 
is unclear what is meant by the notion of a practicing company. 
15
 I take note that in the concluding section the author offers a discussion of the term ‘value matrix’. 
p.246 However, this discussion does not inform his model. 
16 Lu, p. 235 
17 Lu, p. 235 
18 Lu, p. 236 
19 Lu, p. 246 
20 Lu, p. 236 
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‘Other Licensors’ 
This term informs the empirical model, but 
one does not receive a clear definition of 
what is meant by this term. One only reads 
about ‘other licensors’ and that such firms 
are not ‘universities, research institutions, 
federal laboratories, and individuals.’ 
‘Other licensors’ are described as 
‘practicing companies’ as licensors and 
exclude transactions with licensors as 
universities, research institutions, federal 
laboratories, and individuals.’21  
 
Also here it is unclear what is meant by the 
notion of a practicing company. 
Market Comparable Approach 
This term is inadequately defined in the 
paper. It is only explained with reference to a 
comparison between ‘NPEs’ and ‘other 
licensors.’ That is, it is briefly mentioned 
with respect to two other terms which are 
also not adequately defined.  
This study takes an alternative approach, the 
market-comparable approach, which 
compares the royalties earned by NPE 
licensors with those earned by other 
licensors.’22  
Over Compensation 
The term is defined with reference to the 
‘intrinsic value’. Since the term ‘intrinsic 
value is not properly defined it is also not 
possible to understand what is meant by the 
term overcompensation. 
The term overcompensated is defined as 
‘higher payments than what the intrinsic 
value of the patent is.’  
 
But what then is the intrinsic value of the 
patent? 23 
 
 
Apart from the many other substantial flaws that this research piece suffers from, this lack of 
definitions is fatal. If one is not even able to understand what phenomenon one is actually 
seeking to decipher, how can one assess its economic effect? 
The article fails to empirically proof hold-up 
In spite of a lengthy discussion, the empirical model does not succeed in assessing whether 
hold-up exists or not. Instead, the article undertakes an assessment on what is called the ‘market 
based comparable rate.’24 There is no discussion of this method in the paper and there is also 
no explanation given why this method is selected over another valuation approach. There is 
also no discussion as to what insight can be gained from this valuation approach, nor why the 
 
21 Lu, p. 240 
22 Lu, p. 240 
23 Lu, p. 236 
24
  Lu, J. J. (2012). The myths and facts of patent troll and excessive payment: have nonpracticing 
entities (NPEs) been overcompensated? Business Economics, 47, p. 239, 240 
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comparable licenses approach is fit to address the research question. Hence, the sole factor that 
informs the empirical analysis is the notion of a ‘benchmark.’25  
The data used is unverifiable. In fact, neither ktMine26 nor Royalty Source27 allow to publicly 
disclose information obtained from their database. This is why these data sources fail to provide 
the necessary baseline to verify this model.28  
Even if one leaves all these shortcomings aside, the way the comparable approach is undertaken 
is inadequate. It is unclear what constitutes a comparable licensing contract in this model. The 
paper provides a range of search criteria.29 These search criteria are used to instruct staff from 
ktMine and RoyaltySource to undertake a search for licensing agreements in their respective 
databases. However, these are just practical instructions. For example, only licensing 
 
25
 P. 239 and 240 he describes the benchmark as the ‘market based comparable’ rate. But what this 
means is not further established, nor how one can come to this conclusion. P. 236 furthermore 
describes that ‘the patent holder commands a premium above the benchmark royalty by demanding a 
share of the saved redesign cost and/or a share of the infringer’s profit during the redesign period.’ 
26
 See ktMine Terms and Conditions of use for ktMine. Available at 
http://rrf.ktmine.com/TermsOfService.aspx (last checked 1.4.2020) 
27
 RoyaltySource Data Use Agreement. Available at 
https://royaltysource.com/data_use_agreement.html (last checked 1.4.2020) 
28
 The author could only go and try to find the original sources through the sites that ktMine and 
RoyaltySource seek to aggregate, such as the website of the SEC (Securities Exchange Commission), 
but this would be a very time-consuming exercise. 
29
 Lu, J. J. (2012). The myths and facts of patent troll and excessive payment: have nonpracticing 
entities (NPEs) been overcompensated? Business Economics, 47, p. 240  
The following search criteria are used to search for the licensing transactions: 
(a) Include only transactions with fixed or flat running royalty rates expressed as percentages of 
sales. 
(b) Exclude licensing transactions as part of settling litigation or by court orders to insure that 
conclusions are based on market forces. 
(c) Exclude licensing transactions between NPEs or their subsidiaries. The searches yielded 46 
transactions with fixed running royalty rates as percentages of sales, with NPEs as licensors. The 
second step is to generate comparable transactions in which licensors are not NPEs, based on the 
criteria listed above and the following: 
(d) Match each of the 46 transactions by industry and technology field. 
(e) Include only the transactions with practicing companies as licensors and exclude transactions 
with licensors as universities, research institutions, federal laboratories, and individuals.6 
For each of the 46 NPE transactions, two comparable transactions are compiled based on criteria 
(a), (b), (d), and (e), yielding a list of 92 comparable transactions. As a result, a total of 138 license 
agreements are collected as a result of reviewing 1,100 license agreement summaries and 315 license 
agreements.  
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agreements are selected that contain a running royalty rate and are based on net sales. This 
alone constitutes a selection bias. One can very well select comparable licensing rates which 
are not based on net sales and are not hinged on a running royalty rate. However, one needs to 
then make the effort to adjust those rates so to express those rates in a similar fashion. Why the 
research design does not include this effort is not understandable. Equally important to note is 
that these practical instructions are not embedded in any legal or economic context whatsoever.  
The notion of ‘comparability’ remains ill defined  
Data provided by ktMine and RoyaltySource shows a high level of heterogeneity. Who the 
licensor and licensee are, their market size, geographical scope, their market power or sales 
volume can all influence the dynamics of the licensing negotiation and by consequence the 
licensing rate. Equally, the effective year and the duration of the licensing contract influence 
the value of a licensing transaction. Other factors that can have an influence on the worth of a 
licensing contract are the royalty base, the subject of the license, the size and strength of the 
patent portfolio, whether the license only covers patents or other intangibles, if it is a cross 
license or if there are additional payments made. The table below offers an overview of the 
type of data structure that one may expect from such databases. 
Table 2: Typical Categories one may expect in Databases for Comparable Licenses 
 
Chien discusses these in his article and shows that ‘the majority of material software licenses 
reported by public companies to the SEC from 2000-2015 (N=245), which are 
nonrepresentative of licenses in general, to support true technology transfer. The research was 
Ref. Licensor/Licensee Industry Effective YeaDuration Agreement Type Description Royalty Rate * Royalty Base Original Base Territory Additional Payments
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based on reading through hundreds of licensing contracts.’30 This insight is informative as the 
author’s research team has actually read the licensing contracts and offered a comprehensive 
insight into the agreements as a whole. I am unable to see that for the purpose of this research 
the entire licensing agreements were read and analysed.31  
One cannot correct the substantial flaw of having failed to adequately encapsulate the notion 
of a benchmark in the context of this research piece. This, jointly with the unverifiable data 
presented are substantial and fundamentally irreparable errors of this document and they make 
the discussion presented in this report useless.  
Even if the articles based its claim on one single valuation method, it would have been 
necessary to substantiate the notion of comparability. In a U.S. context the article could have 
made use of the Georgia Pacific Criteria,32 which are annexed to this comment.  
The Georgia Pacific Criteria stipulate that factors such as the rate paid by the licensee for 
similar patents need to be considered, that one needs to understand the commercial relationship 
between the licensor and the licensee, understand the duration of the patent and term of the 
license. They also ask, among other things that one needs to understand the profits of the 
product made under the patent, its commercial success and current popularity and that one 
needs to get a grasp of the performance of the patented technology over older technological 
solutions or next best alternatives. One should further seek to understand the extent to which 
the infringer has made use of the invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that 
use. Georgia Pacific Criteria 12 also requires that one determines the portion or of the selling 
price that may be customary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for 
the use of the invention or analogous inventions. Criteria 13 again asks that one should 
 
30
 Chien, C. V. (2017). The Market for Software Innovation Through the Lens of Patent Licenses and 
Sales. Berkeley Tech. LJ (2017), 31. 
31
 Lu only identifies on p.240 the criteria already discussed above.  
32
 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 1116, 1120, 1121. 
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determine the portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as 
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or 
significant features of improvements added by the infringer. What is cited here is not 
exhaustive. 
Had the article taken the Georgia Pacific framework under consideration, it would have forced 
the article to assess the commercial dynamics that prevail between the licensor or licensee. This 
in itself is a substantial effort as it requires to understand the dynamics that prevailed at the 
time the license was concluded. Also, it is important to assess the contribution the patent had 
to the infringer’s business. What role did the patent play in the infringer’s company? Was the 
patented technology crucial to the infringer’s corporate success? Was it a patent that read on a 
standard and hence subject to the RAND (reasonable and non-discriminatory) agreement?  
What were the technical features of the patent? Was it a portfolio of patents that was licensed 
or just a single patent?  
Even if the article had opted to work outside the Georgia Pacific Framework, it would have 
still been necessary to come to grips with the notion of comparability. It would have been 
necessary to study in depth the subject matter of the license, the patents that are subject to the 
license, the age of the license or other criteria that help establish the notion of comparability.  
The paper offers no insight on any of these crucial questions. I understand that this is a massive 
undertaking, but it would be instrumental to make such assessments so to gain an insight into 
the comparability of the licensing contracts under analysis.  
The research is not replicable  
The highly in transparent sample article presents is not tested for such criteria. This is a critical 
and equally fatal error. The few practical instructions that were given to the search team of 
ktMine and RoyaltySource are not enough to provide substantiated insights into this matter. 
11 
 
Jurisprudence around the world has shown that the choice of the comparable licensing contract 
in a benchmark approach is a crucial element of a royalty rate determination. The types of 
licensing rates that Courts allowed and/or rejected have also been instrumental in shaping 
substantial aspects of the law and reasoning on what is ‘comparable.’  
When comparable licensing rates are being used in judicial proceedings, Courts tend to usually 
permit only a handful of licensing contracts. Often, there are not more than one or two licensing 
contracts that a Court admits as a comparable agreement. However, this article claims to have 
been able to cover a sample size of 138 licensing agreements.33 In my opinion, this is only 
possible because the criteria for comparability are relaxed and the Georgia Pacific criteria are 
ignored.  
The article mixes up a host of different industries 
The article also mixes up a host of different industries in the empirical analysis. In particular, 
it looks at sectors as diverse as the biological and pharmaceutical industry, the semiconductor 
sector and the telecommunication sector. There is also a completely undefined sector called 
‘others.’34 All of these sectors have different market dynamics and the role that IP can play 
there is different. 
In the pharmaceutical sector for example, patents are often used to protect a single product (i.e. 
a medication) and much of the debate centres around the access of patented medication and the 
role of generic companies. In the telecommunications sector again, the role IP can assume is 
quite different. Here much of the debate is about patents and network access. Historically, 
NPEs have found this area to be a more appealing playing ground than the pharmaceutical 
sector. The reason is simple. The patents that protect the medication are usually owned by a 
 
33
 Lu, p. 240 Table 3 
34
 Lu, p.240 Table 3 
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pharmaceutical company itself and it is not customary to outsource such patents to a NPE, so 
it can obtain royalties from infringers. Rather, the pharmaceutical industry is keen to obtain an 
injunction. Hence, involving a NPE makes little sense in this context.  
I am just citing here some examples. Certainly, more could be said about the market and IP 
dynamics in these various sectors. However, in this paper I do not see any debate of these 
various sectors and it is also not clear why these specific sectors are selected and not other 
ones. Such a debate would however be crucially important, so to inform the empirical model.  
The research lacks adequate references to the academic literature 
Other issues with this paper pertain to the overall negligence in the way the document is 
referenced and the way the NTP, Inc v RIM Ltd case is discussed. The NTP, Inc v RIM Ltd 
case is cited, but the reason why the public at large criticised the case remains not addressed. 
In particular, it is cautiously omitted to discuss the reason for the public outrage.35  
In the introductory sections for example the article seeks to establish various strings in the 
academic literature, but fails to offer any reference whatsoever that would actually allow to 
understand who and what is actually meant with this string of academic literature.36  
 
 
 
35
 Ibid, p. 234 
36
 Lu, p. 234 – who is he citing here? 
The NPE business model has also sparked hot debate among legal scholars and economists. Some 
believe that the business model is against the fundamental principles of patent law and that NPEs take 
advantage of loopholes in current patent law to file excessive and often baseless lawsuits against 
practicing companies. In their view, this has overburdened producers, stifled innovation, and clogged 
up the court system. However, other scholars argue that NPEs are generally premarket.  
p. 235 – who is he citing here? 
Alternatively, the narrowest definition of troll is an NPE that uses weak patents to hold up practicing 
companies or to file multiple suits that result in settlements because the 
practicing companies want to avoid the costs of litigation. 
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Table 3: Statements made in Lu’s paper, which lack a Reference 
The NPE business model has also sparked 
hot debates among legal scholars and 
economists. Some believe that the business 
model is against the fundamental principles 
of patent law and that NPEs take advantage 
of loopholes in current patent law to file 
excessive and often baseless lawsuits 
against practicing companies. In their view, 
this has overburdened producers, stifled 
innovation, and clogged up the court 
system.37 
Statement is not referenced.  
Who are those legal scholars and 
economists?  
Why did they say that and in what context? 
However, other scholars argue that 
NPEs are generally promarket. NPEs can 
compensate those innovators and 
entrepreneurs who exit—voluntarily or 
involuntarily—for their innovation and 
entrepreneurship, thus helping to ensure that 
the innovations are introduced into the 
economy.38 
Statement is not referenced.  
Who are those other scholars?  
Why did they say that and in what context? 
Also, by acting as intermediaries in license 
markets, NPEs increase market liquidity and 
efficiency.39 
Statement is not referenced. No evidence 
offered to substantiate the argument. 
The stakes in the debate over the impact of 
NPEs is high for all players, especially in 
light of current legislative efforts to reform 
patent law.40 
Statement is not referenced.  
What legislative reform is being referred to 
here? 
Alternatively, the narrowest definition of 
troll is an NPE that uses weak patents to 
hold up practicing companies or to file 
multiple suits that result in settlements 
because the practicing companies want to 
avoid the costs of 
litigation.41 
Statement is not referenced. 
No evidence offered to substantiate the 
argument 
On the other hand, a significant pool of 
literature argues that although holdup can be 
adopted by both NPEs and practicing 
companies as a tactic to obtain exorbitant 
payments from targeted companies, the 
expected rate of success and the magnitude 
of overpayment are dependent on restrictive 
Statement is not referenced. 
No evidence offered to substantiate the 
argument. 
Who stated this? 
What were their findings? 
Why are they restrictive and simplifications? 
 
 
37
 Lu, J. J. (2012). The myths and facts of patent troll and excessive payment: have nonpracticing 
entities (NPEs) been overcompensated? Business Economics, 47, p.234 
38
 Ibid, p. 234 
39
 Ibid, p. 234 
40
 Ibid, p. 235 
41
 Ibid, p. 235 
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assumptions and simplifications.42 
In other words, the outcomes of holdup 
tactics are specific to the assumptions made 
by the various models, and these 
assumptions rarely hold in the real world of 
licensing.43 
Statement is not referenced. 
Why? What can be done to substantiate this 
argument? There is no proof offered for this 
statement. 
In stark contrast to the literature in 
theoretical 
modelling and analytical study, empirical   
research is scanty.44 
Statement is not referenced. There is no 
proof offered for this statement. 
A few recent empirical studies offer 
contradicting evidence, with some studies 
affirming overcompensation and others 
refuting it.45 
Statement is not referenced. 
Who stated this? 
What were their findings? 
 
Furthermore, empirical research to date 
concentrates largely on litigated patents and 
patent damage awards.46 
Statement is not referenced. 
Who stated this? 
What were their findings? 
 
This finding contradicts the argument 
that NPEs are systematically 
overcompensated, 
at least based on evidence from the license 
market.47 
Statement is not referenced. 
Who stated this? 
What were their findings? 
 
The conclusion reached in this paper, 
coupled 
with other major findings from relevant 
empirical studies about NPEs, patent 
litigation, and damage awards…48  
Statement is not referenced. 
What are these major findings? 
 
 
First of all, conventional economics of 
industrial organization theory imply that 
royalty rates charged by NPEs will be 
higher because of pricing inefficiencies.49 
Statement is not referenced. 
Which conventional economics?  
Who says that? 
While economists have long used such 
metrics to measure the value of patents,50… 
Statement is not referenced. 
Which economists? 
Who said that? 
 
 
42
 Ibid, p. 235 
43
 Ibid, p. 235 
44
 Ibid, p. 235 
45
  Ibid, p. 235 
46
 Ibid, p. 235 
47
 Ibid, p. 235 
48
 Ibid, p. 235 
49
 Ibid, p. 239 
50
 Ibid, p. 246 
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Certain passages of Lu’s paper are written in a polemic manner, which reveal in my opinion 
the political motivation of the paper. 
Table 4: Polemic Statements in the paper 
Some NPEs assert their 
patents against practicing 
companies that have made 
irreversible capital 
investments in the patented 
technology in order to 
demand exorbitant royalties 
or seek excessive 
settlements and damage 
awards—a practice 
commonly referred to as 
holdup or trolling.51 
Comparing patent hold-up to 
trolling comes across as 
rather polemic. 
Still, because NPEs do not 
need operating freedom in 
production and cannot be 
countersued, they may 
substantially increase holdup 
risk and therefore can be 
more dangerous.52 
The term ‘dangerous’ comes 
across as rather polemic. 
 
The article suffers from multiple statistical and data shortcomings 
 
Besides multiple statistical and data shortcomings, the article also suffers from severe problems 
regarding the applied methodology and the chosen research approach. The analysed licencing 
rates exhibit a strong degree of heterogeneity.  Just accounting for a few licence variations, 
such as different industries, will not improve the deeper comparability issue. In other words, 
data limitations and the complexity of the licencing process of NPEs and practicing companies 
make it impossible to systematically analyse a potential overcompensation through the lens of 
a statistical model. Therefore, using a methodology based on an econometric framework such 
as the one used here will deliver unreliable results.  
 
51
 Ibid, p. 234 
52
 Ibid, p. 237 
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One will need to accept that highly complex issues such as what impact NPEs have on the 
economy and society at large cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. Against this 
background, the only reasonable thing to do would be to retract the document.   
 
Annex  
Georgia Pacific Criteria53  
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or 
tending to prove an established royalty.  
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit.  
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as restricted or 
nonrestricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the manufactured product may be 
sold.  
4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent monopoly 
by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under special conditions 
designed to preserve that monopoly.  
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether they are 
competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether they are inventor and 
promoter.  
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the 
licensee; that existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-
patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.  
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.  
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent, its commercial success; 
and its current popularity. 
 9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, that 
had been used for working out similar results. 
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of it as 
owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention.  
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any evidence probative 
of the value of that use.  
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the particular 
business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous 
inventions.  
 
53
 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) at 1120 
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13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished 
from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features 
or improvements added by the infringer.  
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.  
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer) 
would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and 
voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee-- who 
desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article 
embodying the patented invention-- would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able 
to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent 
patentee who was willing to grant a license. 
 
 
